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Games in Convex Domains via Analytical Barriers
Rui Yan, Student Member, IEEE, Zongying Shi, Member, IEEE, and Yisheng Zhong
Abstract—This work considers a multiplayer reach-avoid game
between two adversarial teams in a general convex domain which
consists of a target region and a play region. The evasion team,
initially lying in the play region, aims to send as many its team
members into the target region as possible, while the pursuit
team with its team members initially distributed in both play
region and target region, strives to prevent that by capturing
the evaders. We aim at investigating a task assignment about
the pursuer-evader matching, which can maximize the number
of the evaders who can be captured before reaching the target
region safely when both teams play optimally. To address this, two
winning regions for a group of pursuers to intercept an evader are
determined by constructing an analytical barrier which divides
these two parts. Then, a task assignment to guarantee the most
evaders intercepted is provided by solving a simplified 0-1 integer
programming instead of a non-deterministic polynomial problem,
easing the computation burden dramatically. It is worth noting
that except the task assignment, the whole analysis is analytical.
Finally, simulation results are also presented.
Index Terms—Reach-avoid games; Multi-agent systems; Barri-
ers; Pursuit-evasion games; Optimal control; Differential games
I. INTRODUCTION
THIS paper studies a multiplayer reach-avoid (RA) gamebetween two adversarial teams of cooperative players
playing in a convex bounded planar domain, which is parti-
tioned into a target region and a play region by a straight line.
Starting from the play region, the evasion team aims to send as
many its team members, called evaders, into the target region
as possible. Conversely, the pursuit team initially lying in the
target region and play region, strives to prevent the evasion
team from doing so by attempting to capture the evaders.
Actually, from another side, this game can also be viewed as
an evasion team tries to escape from a bounded region through
an exit which is represented by a straight line, while avoiding
adversaries and moving obstacles formulated as a pursuit
team. Such a differential game is a powerful theoretical tool
for analyzing realistic situations in robotics, aircraft control,
security, reachability analysis and other domains [1]–[5]. For
example, in collision avoidance and path planning, how a
group of vehicles can get into some target set or escape from
a bounded region through an exit, while avoiding dangerous
situations, such as collisions with static or moving obstacles
[6]–[8]. In region pursuit games, multiple pursuers are used
to intercept multiple adversarial intruders [9]–[11]. In safety
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verification, an agent often needs to judge whether it can
guarantee its arrival into a safe region throughout plenty of
dynamic dangers, such as disturbances and adversaries [12].
In the references [13] and [14], cooperative behaviors within
pursuit-evasion games are analyzed in order to help or rescue
teammates in the presence of adversarial players.
However, finding cooperative strategies and task assignment
among multiple players, especially when two teams both
consist of multiple members, can be challenging [15], as
computing solutions over the joint state space of multiple
players can greatly increase computational complexity, beyond
the scope of traditional dynamic programming [1]. In [16], a
formal analysis and taxonomy of task allocation in multi-robot
systems is presented. More recently, a distributed version of
the Hungarian method [17] and consensus-based decentralized
auction and bundle algorithms [18] are proposed to solve the
multirobot assignment problem. The authors in [19] study the
problem of multirobot active target tracking by processing
relative observations. Due to the conflicting and asymmetric
goals between two teams, complex cooperations and non-
intuitive strategies within each team may exist. Although
some techniques have been used to analyze RA games and
demonstrated to work well in some conditions, they are mostly
numerical algorithms and suffer from some weaknesses, such
as highly computational complexity, conservation, strong as-
sumption and application limitations [20]–[23].
Although the problem considered in this paper is different
from the classical pursuit-evasion games that have been thor-
oughly studied, we borrow several existing notions and modify
their definitions slightly to address our current scenario. For
RA games, as Isaacs’ book [24] shows, the core point is to
construct the barrier, which is the boundary of the RA set,
splitting the entire state space into two disjoint parts: Pursuit
Winning Region (PWR) and Evasion Winning Region (EWR).
The PWR is the region of initial conditions, from which the
pursuit team can ensure the capture before the evader enters
the target region. The EWR, complementary to the PWR, is
the region of initial conditions, from which the evader can
succeed to reach the target region regardless of the pursuit
team’s strategies. The surface that separates the PWR from
the EWR is called barrier.
In principle, the Hamilton-Jacob-Isaacs (HJI) approach is
an ideal tool for solving general RA games when the game
is low-dimensional, such as autonomous river navigation for
underactuated vehicles [25] and safety specifications in hybrid
systems [26]. By defining a value function merging the payoff
function and discriminator function with minmax operation,
this approach involves solving a HJI partial differential equa-
2tion (PDE) in the joint state space of the players and locating
the barrier by finding the zero sublevel set of this value
function. The players’ optimal strategies can be extracted
from the gradient of the value function. Generally, there
are two approaches to solve the HJI PDEs: the method of
characteristics [14] and numerical approximation of the value
function on a grid of the continuous state space [27]–[29].
However, in practical applications, two approaches both face
computational challenges. Non-unique terminal conditions in
RA game setups, capture or entry into the target set, make
it difficult to generate strategies by characteristic solutions
which require backward integration from terminal manifold,
as different backward trajectories may produce complicated
singular surfaces for which there exist no systematic analysis
methods [30]. On the other hand, a number of numerical
tools for solving HJI PDEs on grids have been provided
to solve practical problems [28]. Unfortunately, the curse
of dimensionality makes these approaches computationally
intractable in our multiplayer RA games, as the grid required
for approximating the value function scales exponentially with
the number of players.
For certain games and game setups, geometric method
shows an incredible power in providing strategies for the
players [31]–[33]. For example, Voronoi diagrams, dividing
a plane into regions of points that are closest to a prede-
termined set of seed points, are widely used for generating
strategies in pursuit-evasion games, usually when each player
possesses the same speed. Especially in group pursuit of a
single evader or multiple evaders, Voronoi-based approaches
can provide very constructive cooperative strategies, such as
minimizing the area of the generalized Voronoi partition of
the evader [34], [35] or pursuing the evader in a relay way
[36]. As for unequal speed scenarios, the Apollonius circle,
first introduced by Isaacs, is a useful tool for analyzing the
capture of a high-speed evader by using multiple pursuers
[37], [38]. More realistically, when pursuit-evasion games are
played in the presence of obstacles that inhibit the motions
of the players, Euclidean shortest path method is employed to
construct the dominance region in [39], and visibility-based
target tracking games are addressed in [40] and [41]. The work
by Katsev et al. [42] introduces a simple wall-following robot
to map and solve pursuit-evasion strategies in an unknown
polygonal environment. The authors [43] revisit the lion and
man problem by introducing line-of-sight visibility. In [44],
the number of pursuers which can guarantee to capture an
equal speed evader in polygonal environment with obstacles, is
investigated. For RA games, a number of straight lines called
paths of defense, separating the target set from evaders, are
created successively to compute an approximate 2D slice of the
reach-avoid set, which eases the computational burden sharply
[9].
The construction of barrier, the most central and important
part in RA games, has attracted a lot of attention in pursuit-
evasion games and until now, achieved remarkable results
[45]–[48]. For example, in [49] and [50], the authors compute
the barrier for a pursuit-evasion game between an omnidirec-
tional evader and a differential drive robot. For the problem of
tracking an evader in an environment containing a corner, the
method of explicit policy is used to investigate the escape set
and the track set [51]. In the reference [52], the boundary of
reach-avoid set is studied for general reach-avoid differential
games. By adopting the method of characteristics or numerical
approximation on grid, the barrier for two players or at
most three players is constructed analytically or numerically.
However, computing the barrier directly for more than three
players in pursuit-evasion games is missing, resulting from the
intrinsic high dimensionality of the joint state space.
Compared with the traditional pursuit-evasion games, RA
games are more complicated and have more practical signif-
icance, as the evaders aim to not only avoid the capture, but
also strive to reach a target set. To our best knowledge, the
current work for RA games mainly focuses on the construction
of barrier in two-player scenarios [9], [28], [29]. The methods
in [9], [28], [29] are numerical and cannot directly obtain
the barrier for multiple players due to the high computation
burden. The work [38] is most similar to this work, but it
only considers two pursuers and one evader case without
involving the complicated cooperations among the pursuit
team occurring in this work, and it only focuses on a square
game domain which is quite limited. Moreover, our current
work also allows the pursuers to start the game in the target
region, which is not considered in [38].
In this work, an analytical study on the number of the
evaders which the pursuit team would be able to prevent from
reaching the target region, is presented by generating a task
assignment, namely, pursuer-evader matching pairs. Actually,
the above analysis refers to a game of kind [24]. To this
end, all pursuers are first classified into all possible coalitions.
Then, an evasion region method is proposed to construct the
barrier analytically for each pursuit coalition versus one evader
in convex domains, which is the first time in the existing
literature to construct the barrier directly for multiplayer games
with more than three players involved. More importantly, the
constructed barrier is analytical and overcomes the curse of
dimensionality. Finally, with rich prior information in hand
about which evaders can be intercepted by a specified pursuit
coalition, a maximum pursuer-evader matching is given such
that the most evaders are intercepted.
The original contributions of this paper are as follows. First,
the analytical barrier is constructed for one pursuer and two
pursuers versus one evader in convex domains. Second, the
analytical barrier for multiple pursuers versus one evader is
given, involving two kinds of initial deployments shown in
Assumptions 2 and 3, which can determine the capturable
and uncapturable regions for these pursuers. Third, since all
possible cooperations among the pursuit team are considered,
the upper bound on the number of the evaders which the
pursuit team can guarantee to intercept, is given by solving
a 0-1 integer programming instead of a non-deterministic
polynomial problem, greatly easing the computation burden.
Fourth, except the task assignment, the whole analysis is
analytical, allowing for real-time updates. These contributions
provide a complete solution from the perspective of the task
assignment to multiplayer RA games in any convex domains
consisting of a target region and a play region separated by a
straight line.
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Fig. 1. Multiplayer reach-avoid games in convex domains, where the pursuit
team with multiple pursuers (blue circles) wants to capture the most evaders
(red triangles) before these evaders enter the target region. Our goal is to find
a task assignment for the pursuit team to guarantee the most evaders captured,
involving pursuer-evader matching pairs.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
the problem statement is given. In Section III, some important
preliminaries are presented. In Section IV, the barrier and
winning regions for one pursuit coalition versus one evader,
are found. In Section V, the task assignment for the pursuit
team to capture the most evaders, is designed. In Section VI,
simulation results are presented. Finally, Section VII concludes
the paper and the future work is discussed.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
A. Multiplayer Reach-Avoid Games
Consider Np + Ne players partitioned into two teams, a
pursuit team of Np pursuers, {Pi}
Np
i=1 = {P1, ..., PNp}, and an
evasion team of Ne evaders, {Ej}
Ne
j=1 = {E1, ..., ENe}, whose
states are constrained in a bounded, convex domain Ω ⊂ R2
with boundary ∂Ω. Each player is assumed to be a mass point.
As Fig. 1 shows, a straight line T ⊂ Ω, called target line,
divides Ω into two disjoint parts Ωtar and Ωplay. The compact
set Ωtar, called target region, represents the region which the
evasion team strives to enter while the pursuit team tries to
protect. The play region Ωplay = Ω \ Ωtar corresponds to
the region in which two teams play the game. Also note that
T ⊂ Ωtar. Let xPi(t) = (xPi (t), yPi(t)) ∈ R
2 and xEj (t) =
(xEj (t), yEj (t)) ∈ R
2 be the positions of Pi and Ej at time
t, respectively. The dynamics of the players are described by
the following decoupled system for t ≥ 0:
x˙Pi(t) = vPiuPi(t), xPi (0) = x
0
Pi , i = 1, ..., Np
x˙Ej (t) = vEjuEj (t), xEj (0) = x
0
Ej , j = 1, ..., Ne
(1)
where x0Pi = (x
0
Pi
, y0Pi) ∈ R
2 and x0Ej = (x
0
Ej
, y0Ej ) ∈ R
2
are the initial positions of Pi and Ej , respectively. The
maximum speeds of Pi and Ej are denoted by vPi and vEj
respectively. The control inputs at time t for Pi and Ej are
uPi(t) and uEj (t) respectively, and they satisfy the constraint
uPi(t),uEj (t) ∈ U = {u ∈ R
2|‖u‖2 = 1}, where ‖·‖2 stands
for the Euclidean norm in R2. Unless needed for clarity, to
simplify notations, t will be omitted hereinafter.
The goal of the evasion team is to send as many evaders as
possible into Ωtar without being captured, while the pursuit
team strives to prevent the evasion team from that by capturing
Pursuit Coalition:
Member: P1
1 2 3 4 2Np−1
P2 P1,P2 P3 ...
...
P1,P2,...,PNp
Fig. 2. All possible pursuit coalitions in a pursuit team with Np pursuers
coded in a binary way. For example, the binary code of 3 is 11, and thus the
pursuit coalition 3’s members are P1 and P2, namely, m1 = 1 and m2 = 2.
the evaders. Naturally, once an evader enters Ωtar, the pursuer
cannot capture it hereinafter. Assume that Ej is captured by Pi
in Ωplay if Ej’s position coincides with Pi’s position, that is,
the point-capture is considered. Our paper aims to investigate
an optimal interception matching scheme for the pursuit team
such that the most evaders can be intercepted, and also provide
strategy instructions for the evasion team.
In view of the pursuit team’s goal, all possible coopera-
tions among the pursuers must be considered, which is not
involved in the existing literature on multiplayer RA games.
The maximum matching employed by [9] can only provide
a suboptimal strategy for the pursuit team, as cooperation
is only introduced at the matching step. Since the pursuit
team has Np pursuers, one can select one-pursuer coalitions,
two-pursuer coalitions...until Np-pursuer coalitions, as Fig. 2
shows. Therefore, there are 2Np − 1 alternatives for pursuit
coalitions among Np pursuers. These coalitions are labeled
from 1 to 2Np − 1 successively, so that they can be coded in
a binary way as follows.
Definition 1 (Binary Coalitions for Pursuit Team). ∀k =
1, ..., 2Np − 1, Pi belongs to the pursuit coalition k if the
i-th bit from low order side in binary representation of k is 1.
Then, denote the index set of the pursuers in pursuit coalition
k by Ik = {mj|1 ≤ mj ≤ Np, j = 1, 2, ..., nk} satisfying
mi < mj for i < j, where nk is the number of the pursuers
in pursuit coalition k.
Definition 2 (Pursuit Subcoalition). Consider two pursuit
coalitions k1 and k2. If every pursuer in k1 occurs in k2, then
k1 is called a pursuit subcoalition of k2.
Obviously, there are plenty of ways to code these pursuit
coalitions, but this binary way is very convenient to determine
every coalition’s members by only recording its number, as
Fig. 2 shows. For example, for the pursuit coalition k = 5,
since the binary representation of 5 is 101, thus this pursuit
coalition’s members are P1 and P3, namely, m1 = 1 and
m2 = 3. The adoption of pursuit subcoalition will tremen-
dously simplify our problems as discussed below.
B. Information Structure and Assumptions
As is the usual convention in the differential game theory,
the equilibrium outcomes crucially depend on the informa-
tion structure employed by each player. Classically, the state
feedback information structure allows each player to choose
its current input, uPi or uEj , based on the current value
of the information set {xP1 , · · · ,xPNp ,xE1 , · · · ,xENe }. This
paper focuses on a non-anticipative information structure, as
commonly adopted in the differential game literature (see
for example [27], [53]). Under this information structure, the
pursuit team is allowed to make decisions about its current
4input with all the information of state feedback, plus the
evasion team’s current input. While the evasion team is at
a slight disadvantage under this information structure, at a
minimum he has access to sufficient information to use state
feedback, because the pursuit team must declare his strategy
before the evasion team chooses a specific input and thus the
evasion team can determine the response of the pursuit team
to any input signal. Thus, the multiplayer reach-avoid games
formulated here are an instantiation of the Stackelberg game
[1].
As Fig. 1 shows, let m and n denote the endpoints of T ,
and assume ‖m − n‖2 = l. Fix the origin at m, and build
a Cartesian coordinate system with x-axis along the straight
line through m and n, and y-axis perpendicular to x-axis and
pointing to Ωtar. For unity, we assume that R
n = R1×n, where
n is a positive integer.
Next, it is assumed that the following conditions are satisfied
by the initial configurations of the players, where Assumptions
2 and 3 will be separately considered.
Assumption 1 (Isolate Initial Deployment). The initial posi-
tions of the players satisfy the three conditions:
1) ‖x0Pi − x
0
Pj
‖2 > 0 for all i, j = 1, ..., Np, i 6= j;
2) ‖x0Ei − x
0
Ej
‖2 > 0 for all i, j = 1, ..., Ne, i 6= j;
3) ‖x0Pi − x
0
Ej
‖2 > 0 for all i = 1, ..., Np, j = 1, ..., Ne.
It can be seen that Assumption 1 guarantees that all players
start to play the game from different initial positions and every
evader is not captured by the pursuers initially.
Assumption 2 (Constrained Initial Deployment). Suppose that
x
0
Pi
∈ Ωplay ∪ T for all i = 1, ..., Np and x0Ej ∈ Ωplay for all
j = 1, ..., Ne.
Assumption 3 (Relaxed Initial Deployment). Suppose that
x
0
Pi
∈ Ω for all i = 1, ..., Np and x0Ej ∈ Ωplay for all j =
1, ..., Ne.
In Assumptions 2 and 3, restricting the evaders’ initial
positions into Ωplay is a reasonable assumption for our RA
games, as the evader wins once it enters Ωtar. As for the
initial positions of the pursuers, Assumption 2 is employed out
of consideration for developing an extensible basic approach.
Then, the case with more practical initial configuration de-
scribed in Assumption 3 is investigated by building a bridge to
the proposed basic approach. Moreover, an initial deployment
is admissible if Assumptions 1 and 2 or 1 and 3 hold.
Generally, in multiplayer RA games, the pursuers are homo-
geneous and the same for the evaders, such as confrontation
between two species, and collision avoidance in the environ-
ment with similar dynamic obstacles. Thus, our discussion
assumes that the pursuers have the same maximum speed vP ,
and the evaders have the same maximum speed vE . Define
α = vE/vP to be the speed ratio, and this paper focuses on
the faster pursuers.
Assumption 4 (Speed Ratio). Suppose that vPi = vP > 0, i =
1, ..., Np, and vEj = vE > 0, j = 1, ..., Ne. Assume that
α = vE/vP satisfies 0 < α < 1.
Ej
A
Pi PiEj
A
Re Re
(b)(a)
Fig. 3. The evasion region (ER) and the boundary of ER (BER). (a) The
ER and BER determined by Pi and Ej are Re and A respectively, where A
is a circle and Re is the interior of this circle. (b) The circle A, also called
Apollonius circle, divides R2 into two parts: The interior of the circle is Ej ’s
dominance region, i.e. the ER Re: Ej can reach any point inside the circle
before Pi; the exterior of the circle is Pi’s dominance region: Pi can reach
any point outside the circle before Ej .
III. PRELIMINARIES
A. Computation of the ER and BER
For x,y ∈ R2, define two maps r(x,y) = α‖x−y‖21−α2 and
η(x,y) = x−α
2
y
1−α2 [37], whose geometric meanings will be
stated below.
Let the set of points in R2 that one evader can reach before
one pursuer, regardless of the pursuer’ best effort, be called
evasion region (ER), and the surface which bounds ER is
called the boundary of ER (BER).
Denote the ER and BER determined by Pi and Ej by
Re(x0Ej ,x
0
Pi
) and A(x0Ej ,x
0
Pi
) respectively, which can be
mathematically formulated as follows:
Re =
{
z ∈ R2|‖z− x0Ej‖2 < α‖z− x
0
Pi‖2
}
A =
{
z ∈ R2|‖z− x0Ej‖2 = α‖z− x
0
Pi‖2
}
.
(2)
Also note that
‖z− x0Ej‖
2
2 < α
2‖z− x0Pi‖
2
2 ⇒
∥
∥
∥z−
x
0
Ej
− α2x0Pi
1− α2
∥
∥
∥
2
2
<
α2‖x0Ej − x
0
Pi
‖22
(1− α2)2
⇒ ‖z− η(x0Ej ,x
0
Pi)‖
2
2 < r
2(x0Ej ,x
0
Pi)
(3)
implying that (2) can be equivalently rewritten as
Re =
{
z ∈ R2|‖z− η(x0Ej ,x
0
Pi)‖2 < r(x
0
Ej ,x
0
Pi)
}
A =
{
z ∈ R2|‖z− η(x0Ej ,x
0
Pi)‖2 = r(x
0
Ej ,x
0
Pi)
}
.
(4)
Thus, it can be seen that A is a circle of radius r(x0Ej ,x
0
Pi
)
centered at η(x0Ej ,x
0
Pi
), and Re is the interior of A, shown
in Fig. 3(a). This circle A, also called Apollonius circle [24]
divides R2 into two parts: The interior of the circle is Ej ’s
dominance region, i.e., the ER Re: Ej can reach any point
inside the circle before Pi; the exterior of the circle is Pi’s
dominance region: Pi can reach any point outside the circle
before Ej , as Fig. 3(b) illustrates.
Unless needed for clarity, to simplify notations, drop the
initial positions occurring in the expressions of Re and A.
B. Key Function
Next, present an important lemma about a key function.
Lemma 1 (Monotony of Function). Given Pi and Ej’s initial
positions x0Pi and x
0
Ej
satisfying y0Ej < 0 and x
0
Pi
≤ x0Ej , if
5Ej
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y
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Fig. 4. The monotony of the function G1(xp), where p = (xp, 0) and
G1(c1) = G1(c2) = 0. (a) If xp ∈ (c1, c2), G1(xp) > 0, that is, Ej can
reach p before Pi. (b) If xp ∈ (−∞, c1)∪ (c2,+∞), G1(xp) < 0, that is,
Pi can reach p before Ej . It is proved that there exists a unique maximum
point of G1(xp) for xp ∈ [c1, c2].
A ∩ {z ∈ R2|y = 0} =
{
(c1, 0), (c2, 0)
}
with c1 < c2, the
function
G1(xp) = ‖p− x
0
Pi‖2 −
‖p− x0Ej‖2
α
,p = (xp, 0) (5)
is strictly monotonic increasing when xp ∈ [c1, x∗p], and
strictly monotonic decreasing when xp ∈ [x∗p, c2], where x
∗
p is
the unique solution of the quartic equation
x∗p − x
0
Pi
‖p∗ − x0Pi‖2
=
x∗p − x
0
Ej
α‖p∗ − x0Ej‖2
,p∗ = (x∗p, 0) (6)
in the interval [c1, c2].
Proof: See Fig. 4(a). Take p = (xp, 0). It can be seen that if
xp ∈ [c1, c2], G1(xp) in (5) is actually the distance (depicted
in dashed line) between Pi and Ej exactly when Ej arrives
at p, if Pi and Ej both move directly towards p.
Note that A is a circle. Thus, based on (2), A∩{z ∈ R2|y =
0} =
{
(c1, 0), (c2, 0)
}
with c1 < c2 implies that G1(c1) =
G1(c2) = 0, G1(xp) > 0 for xp ∈ (c1, c2), and G1(xp) < 0
for xp ∈ (−∞, c1) ∪ (c2,+∞). Thus, the maximum point x∗p
of G1(xp) lies in [c1, c2] and satisfies G
′
1(x
∗
p) = 0. If we can
verify G′1(x
∗
p) = 0 admits a unique solution x
∗
p in the interval
[c1, c2], then the lemma is straightforward. First, the existence
of x∗p in the interval [c1, c2] is obvious by noting that G1(xp)
is continuous in this interval. Next, prove the uniqueness.
Take p∗ = (x∗p, 0). By taking the derivative for (5) with
respect to xp, G
′
1(x
∗
p) = 0 means that (6) holds. There are
two cases depending on whether x0Pi < x
0
Ej
or x0Pi = x
0
Ej
,
which will be separately discussed below.
Consider x0Pi < x
0
Ej
first. Since x∗p ∈ [c1, c2], as Fig. 4(a)
shows, we have G1(x
∗
p) ≥ 0, implying that
‖p∗ − x0Pi‖2 ≥
‖p∗ − x0Ej‖2
α
> α‖p∗ − x0Ej‖2. (7)
Then, combining (6) and (7) leads to
|x∗p − x
0
Pi | > |x
∗
p − x
0
Ej |. (8)
Also note that (6) guarantees that x∗p − x
0
Pi
and x∗p − x
0
Ej
have the same plus or minus sign. Thus, by also noting that
x0Pi < x
0
Ej
, then (8) means that x∗p > x
0
Ej
> x0Pi , as Fig. 4(a)
illustrates. Define
G2(x
∗
p) =
‖p∗ − x0Pi‖
2
2(x
∗
p − x
0
Ej
)2
‖p∗ − x0Ej‖
2
2(x
∗
p − x
0
Pi
)2
(9)
and thus (6) can be rewritten as G2(x
∗
p) = α
2. Since α2 < 1,
then G2(x
∗
p) < 1, implying that
‖p∗ − x0Ej‖
2
2(x
∗
p − x
0
Pi)
2 > ‖p∗ − x0Pi‖
2
2(x
∗
p − x
0
Ej )
2
⇒ (y0Ej )
2(x∗p − x
0
Pi)
2 − (y0Pi)
2(x∗p − x
0
Ej )
2 > 0.
(10)
By computing the derivative of G2(x
∗
p) with respect to x
∗
p,
it can be verified that G2(x
∗
p) is strictly monotonic for x
∗
p
satisfying (10) and x∗p > x
0
Ej
> x0Pi . Thus, G2(x
∗
p) = α
2,
i.e., G′1(x
∗
p) = 0, admits a unique solution x
∗
p in the interval
[c1, c2].
If x0Pi = x
0
Ej
, (6) implies that x∗p = x
0
Ej
= x0Pi by noting
(7). Thus, G′1(x
∗
p) = 0 still admits a unique solution x
∗
p in this
case, and we finish the proof.
For simplicity of description, in Lemma 1, only x0Pi ≤ x
0
Ej
is considered. As for x0Pi > x
0
Ej
, the similar conclusion can
be obtained.
C. Base Curves
In the construction of the barrier in Section IV, the following
base curves are utilized, which are very essential to charac-
terize the barrier. We emphasize that the parameters h1,h2
and h3 defined below represent the initial positions of three
different pursuers.
Definition 3 (Base Curves). For h1 = (x1, y1),h2 = (x2, y2)
and h3 = (x3, y3) satisfying yi ≤ 0(i = 1, 2, 3) and x1 <
x2 < x3, define the following curves.
(i). One pursuer case:
F 11 (h1) =
{
z = (x, y) ∈ R2|‖z−m‖2
= α‖h1 −m‖2, x ≤ k1, y < 0
}
F 12 (h1) =
{
z = (x, y) ∈ R2|(x − x1)
2+
(1 − 1/α2)y2 + (1− α2)y21 = 0, x ∈ (k1, k2), y < 0
}
F 13 (h1) =
{
z = (x, y) ∈ R2|‖z− n‖2
= α‖h1 − n‖2, x ≥ k2, y < 0
}
(11)
where k1 = α
2x1 and k2 = (1 − α2)l + α2x1.
(ii). Two pursuers case:
F 21 (h1,h2) = F
1
1 (h1)
F 22 (h1,h2) =
{
z = (x, y) ∈ R2|(x− x1)
2+
(1− 1/α2)y2 + (1− α2)y21 = 0, x ∈ (k3, k4), y < 0
}
F 23 (h1,h2) =
{
z = (x, y) ∈ R2|‖z− pc‖2
= α‖h1 − pc‖2, x ∈ [k4, k5], y < 0
}
F 24 (h1,h2) =
{
z = (x, y) ∈ R2|(x− x2)
2+
(1− 1/α2)y2 + (1− α2)y22 = 0, x ∈ (k5, k6), y < 0
}
F 25 (h1,h2) = F
1
3 (h2)
(12)
where pc = (xc, 0) is the unique point on the x-axis such that
‖pc−h1‖2 = ‖pc−h2‖2. Here, k3 = α2x1, k4 = (1−α2)xc+
α2x1, k5 = (1− α2)xc + α2x2 and k6 = (1− α2)l + α2x2.
(iii). Three pursuers case:
F 3(h1,h2,h3) =
{
z = (x, y) ∈ R2|(x− x2)
2+
(1− 1/α2)y2 + (1− α2)y22 = 0, x ∈ (k7, k8), y < 0
} (13)
6where k7 = (1−α2)xc1+α2x2 and k8 = (1−α2)xc2+α2x2.
Two points pc1 = (xc1, 0) and pc2 = (xc2, 0) are respectively
given by ‖h1 − pc1‖2 = ‖h2 − pc1‖2 and ‖h2 − pc2‖2 =
‖h3 − pc2‖2. Although it is called three pursuers case, F 3
only depends on h2 while the roles of h1 and h3 are to decide
two boundaries k7 and k8 for x. Thus, each point on F
3 only
depends on at most two pursuers by cutting F 3 into two parts.
Remark 1. It can be verified that given h1,h2 and h3, all
base curves are explicit and smooth if they are not empty.
Actually, the following discussion will show that the barrier, a
focus in our paper, is composed by these curves. How to use
these base curves will be stated clearly in the next section.
IV. ONE PURSUIT COALITION VERSUS ONE EVADER
A. Problem Formulation
Before investigating the number of the evaders which would
be captured in Ωplay before entering Ωtar, a subgame between
a pursuit coalition k and Ej is analyzed as a building block.
Denote the joint game domain for the pursuit coalition k
by Ωnk = Ω × · · · × Ω. Similarly, denote the joint play
region, target region, target line and control constraint for
the pursuit coalition k by Ωnkplay,Ω
nk
tar, T
nk and Unk , respec-
tively. Denote the joint control input and initial state of the
pursuit coalition k by Pk =
{
uPm1
, ...,uPmnk
}
∈ Unk and
X 0k =
{
x
0
Pm1
, ...,x0Pmnk
}
∈ R2nk , respectively.
In order to develop a basic approach, we first restrict
X 0k ∈ Ω
nk
play ∪ T
nk in Sections IV-B and IV-C, that is, all
pursuers initially lie in the play region Ωplay or target line T
as Assumption 2 states. Then, the case X 0k ∈ Ω
nk , that is,
all pursuers can start the game from any positions in Ω as
Assumption 3 states, will be discussed in Section IV-D. For
clarity of the description, k refers to the pursuit coalition k.
Given Ω and T , namely, specifying Ωtar and Ωplay, the
following problems will be addressed in this section.
Problem 1. Consider k and Ej . Given X 0k , find the region
WnkP (X
0
k ) ⊂ Ωplay in which if Ej initially lies, there exists
a joint pursuit control input Pk ∈ Unk such that Ej can be
captured before entering Ωtar regardless of its evasion control
input uEj ∈ U .
Problem 2. Consider k and Ej . Given X 0k , find the region
WnkE (X
0
k ) ⊂ Ωplay in which if Ej initially lies, an evasion
control input uEj ∈ U exists such that Ej can enter Ωtar
without being captured regardless of the joint pursuit control
Pk ∈ Unk .
Thus, WnkP (X
0
k ) and W
nk
E (X
0
k ) are the respective winning
regions for k and Ej , and we call them PWR and EWR respec-
tively. According to Isaacs’ book [24], the barrier, denoted by
Bnk(X 0k ), is the surface separatingW
nk
P (X
0
k ) fromW
nk
E (X
0
k ),
on which no team can guarantee its own winning. In this case,
Bnk(X 0k ) is a curve, and B
nk(X 0k )∪W
nk
P (X
0
k )∪W
nk
E (X
0
k ) =
Ωplay. Unless needed for clarity, the initial condition occurring
in the expressions of the barrier and winning regions will be
dropped from now on.
More visually, given X 0k , the winning region W
nk
P can be
interpreted as the capturable region of k when facing one
evader, while the winning region WnkE corresponds to its
uncapturable region. Note that if Bnk can be obtained, WnkP
and WnkE split by B
nk will come out immediately, where the
region closer to T is WnkE , and the other is W
nk
P . Thus, the
primary focus in this section is to construct the barrier Bnk .
For a clear symbol description, Bnk(X 0k ) is the barrier deter-
mined by k with the initial position X 0k and nk pursuers. More
generally, Bnk−1(X 0k \x
0
Pi
) denotes the barrier determined by
a pursuit coalition with the initial position X 0k \x
0
Pi
and nk−1
pursuers, where X 0k \ x
0
Pi
denotes the remainder in X 0k when
x
0
Pi
is eliminated. The similar notations are also applied for
WnkP and W
nk
E .
Let B˘nk , W˘nkP and W˘
nk
E respectively denote the barrier,
PWR, and EWR of k when the boundary of Ωplay is ignored,
which will be used to construct Bnk ,WnkP and W
nk
E . These
three new notations have the similar meanings, citation ways
and notation expressions as Bnk ,WnkP and W
nk
E respectively,
and the only difference is that they are used without consid-
ering the boundary of Ωplay. They are introduced only for a
clear proof.
To clarify clearly, all pursuers in k are classified into two
categories from the perspective of these pursuers’ relative
positions, which plays a crucial role in barrier construction.
Definition 4 (Active and Inactive Pursuers). For a pursuer
Pi(i ∈ Ik) in k, if there exists at least one point in T that Pi
can reach before all other pursuers in k, we call Pi is an active
pursuer in k. Otherwise, we call Pi is an inactive pursuer in
k.
Remark 2. As illustrated below, whether a pursuer is active
or inactive in a pursuit coalition strictly depends on if it
contributes to the barrier construction of this pursuit coalition.
In brief, the contribution means being active. It can be noted
that a pursuer who is inactive in one pursuit coalition may be
active in another pursuit coalition, and vice versa.
Next, introduce a critical payoff function which is employed
to construct the barrier and provides strategies for the players.
Definition 5 (Payoff Function). For k and Ej , if Ej can
succeed to reach T , take the distance of Ej to the closest
pursuer exactly when Ej arrives at T as the payoff function.
This payoff function J and the associated value function V
are respectively given by
J = min
i∈Ik
‖xPi(t1)− xEj (t1)‖2, V = min
Pk∈Unk
max
uEj
∈U
J
(14)
where t1 is the first arrival time when Ej reaches T .
The above payoff function, which is also called safe distance
on arrival, can be interpreted as Ej desires to reach T under
the safest condition, while k wants to approach Ej as close
as possible although the capture cannot be guaranteed.
B. Two Pursuers Versus One Evader
We begin the discussion of the barrier construction by
focusing on an important class of RA subgames with two
pursuers and one evader, namely, when k contains two pur-
suers Pi1 and Pi2. Focusing on this special case enables us to
7develop a scalable and analytical barrier, while also providing
key insights into the barrier construction for general pursuit
coalitions.
When Ωplay is square, the barrier B
2 can be computed by
the method proposed in [38]. However, the shape of Ωplay in
our current case is convex and not only restricted to square,
which is beyond the scope of the previous work while quite
common in general RA games. Our current work also allows
the pursuers to start the game from Ωtar as Section IV-D
shows, which is not involved in [38].
Next, we present a necessary condition that the optimal
trajectories should satisfy if the players adopt their optimal
strategies from (14).
Lemma 2 (Optimal Trajectories). For Pi and Ej , consider
the payoff function (14) when only x0Pi(i ∈ Ik) is considered
in X 0k . Then, the optimal trajectories for Pi and Ej are both
straight lines.
Proof: The Hamiltonian function for this problem is H =
vPuPiλ
T
1 +vEuEjλ
T
2 , where λ1 ∈ R
2 and λ2 ∈ R2 are costate
vectors. Therefore, based on the classical Issacs’s method, the
optimal controls u∗Pi and u
∗
Ej
satisfy
u
∗
Pi = −
λ1
‖λ1‖2
,u∗Ej =
λ2
‖λ2‖2
, λ˙1 = 0, λ˙2 = 0. (15)
Thus, the optimal controls u∗Pi and u
∗
Ej
are time-invariant,
and their optimal trajectories are straight lines.
First, consider the case when k contains only one pursuer,
i.e., X 0k = x
0
Pi
(1 ≤ i ≤ Np).
Theorem 1 (Barrier for One Pursuer). Consider the system
(1) satisfying Assumptions 1, 2 and 4. If a pursuit coalition
k only contains one pursuer Pi, then B1(X 0k ) = B˘
1 ∩ Ωplay,
where B˘1 = ∪3s=1B˘
1
s and B˘
1
s = F
1
s (x
0
Pi
) for all s = 1, 2, 3.
Proof: Since k only contains one pursuer Pi, according to
Definition 1, we have X 0k = x
0
Pi
, nk = 1, and Ik = m1 = i.
Assumption 2 confines x0Pi in Ωplay ∪ T . First, we do not
consider the boundary of Ωplay, namely, focus on the compu-
tation of B˘1 defined in Section IV-A which is proved to consist
of three parts B˘11, B˘
1
2 and B˘
1
3 in the following discussion, as
depicted in Fig. 5(a).
Assume that Ej can succeed to reach T , and denote Ej’s
optimal target point (OTP) in T by p∗ = (x∗p, 0) such that J
in (14) is maximized. It can be seen that in this case, (14) is
simplified to
J = ‖xPi(t1)− xEj (t1)‖2, V = min
uPi
∈U
max
uEj
∈U
J (16)
where t1 is the first arrival time when Ej reaches T .
It follows from Lemma 2 that for the payoff function (16),
the optimal trajectories for Pi and Ej are both straight lines.
Also note that the non-anticipative information structure stated
in Section II-B implies that Pi knows Ej ’s current input (i.e.,
direction of motion). Since Pi aims to minimize J in (16),
the optimal strategy for Pi is to move towards the same target
point in T as Ej does, as Fig. 5(a) illustrates. Hence, if Ej
Pi
Ej
Pi
Ej
W1P
W1E
B1
W˘1E
W˘1P
B˘11
B˘12
B˘13
Ωplay
Ωplay
Ωtar
Ωtar
p
∗
p
∗
T
T
m
m
n
n
x
x
y
y(a)
(b)
Fig. 5. The barrier and two winning regions determined by Pi when playing
with Ej . (a) Without considering the boundary of Ωplay, the barrier B˘
1
consists of three curves: B˘11 (orange), B˘
1
2 (black) and B˘
1
3 (orange). The barrier
B˘1 splits Ωplay into two winning regions W˘
1
P and W˘
1
E . If Ej lies in W˘
1
P ,
Pi can capture Ej before the latter reaches T , while if Ej lies in W˘1E , he
can guarantee his arrival in T . If Ej lies in B˘
1, under two players’ optimal
strategies, Ej is captured by Pi exactly when reaching T . (b) By considering
the boundary of Ωplay, B
1 is given by B˘1∩Ωplay, as the optimal trajectories
for Pi and Ej are both straight lines and Ωplay is convex. Naturally, W˘
1
P
becomes the green region W1P , and W˘
1
E becomes the red region W
1
E .
selects p in T to go, the payoff function J in (16) is equivalent
to the function
G1(xp) = ‖p− x
0
Pi‖2 −
‖p− x0Ej‖2
α
,p = (xp, 0) ∈ T (17)
which is Pi’s distance to Ej exactly when Ej arrives at p, if Pi
and Ej both move directly towards p. Notice that 0 ≤ xp ≤ l,
where l is the length of T .
Note that Ej strives to maximize J , i.e., G1(xp), as (16)
shows. Thus, if Pi and Ej both adopt their optimal strategies,
x∗p must be a maximum point of G1(xp) for xp ∈ [0, l]. Note
that the monotony of G1(xp) has been shown in Lemma 1.
If the maximum point x∗p of G1(xp) for xp ∈ [0, l] occurs in
the interior of [0, l], i.e., (0, l), then x∗p is an extreme point of
G1(xp), that is,
dG1(x
∗
p)
dxp
= 0⇒
x∗p − x
0
Pi
‖p∗ − x0Pi‖2
=
x∗p − x
0
Ej
α‖p∗ − x0Ej‖2
. (18)
Furthermore, assume x0Ej ∈ B˘
1, as Fig. 5(a) shows. Then,
Ej will be captured by Pi exactly when reaching T under two
players’ optimal strategies from (16), namely, V = 0. Thus,
Pi and Ej will reach p
∗ simultaneously as follows:
G1(x
∗
p) = 0⇒ ‖p
∗ − x0Ej‖2 = α‖p
∗ − x0Pi‖2. (19)
This feature (19) reflects that when x0Ej ∈ B˘
1, under two
players’ optimal strategies from (16), no player can guarantee
its winning, namely, the capture and arrival happen at the same
time.
The following analysis will separately consider three cases:
x∗p ∈ (0, l), x
∗
p = 0 and x
∗
p = l, due to their different features.
First, consider x∗p ∈ (0, l). It has been shown above that in
this case, x∗p is an extreme point of G1(xp). Denote this part
of B˘1 by B˘12 which is in black shown in Fig. 5(a). Next, we
compute the expression of B˘12 .
8Substituting (19) into (18) yields
α2(x∗p − x
0
Pi) = x
∗
p − x
0
Ej ⇒ x
∗
p =
x0Ej − α
2x0Pi
1− α2
. (20)
Then, substituting x∗p given by (20) into (19) leads to
∥
∥
∥
(x0Ej − α
2x0Pi
1− α2
, 0
)
− x0Ej
∥
∥
∥
2
2
= α2
∥
∥
∥
(x0Ej − α
2x0Pi
1− α2
, 0
)
− x0Pi
∥
∥
∥
2
2
⇒
(x0Ej − x
0
Pi)
2 + (1 − 1/α2)(y0Ej )
2 + (1− α2)(y0Pi)
2 = 0
(21)
which characterizes the relationship between the initial posi-
tions of Pi and Ej when x
0
Ej
∈ B˘12 . Since x
∗
p ∈ (0, l), (20)
implies
x0Ej ∈
(
α2x0Pi , (1 − α
2)l + α2x0Pi
)
. (22)
Also note that Assumption 2 confines x0Ej in Ωplay, that
is, y0Ej < 0. Hence, given x
0
Pi
, by taking all positions x0Ej
satisfying (21) and (22) with y0Ej < 0, all initial positions of
Ej lying in B˘
1
2 are found. Equivalently, these initial positions
of Ej form the B˘12 . Thus, by replacing x
0
Ej
with a general
variable z ∈ R2, it follows from (21), (22) and y0Ej < 0 that
B˘12 is as follows:
B˘12 =
{
z = (x, y) ∈ R2|(x− x0Pi)
2 + (1 − 1/α2)y2
+(1− α2)(y0Pi)
2 = 0, x ∈ (k1, k2), y < 0
} (23)
where k1 = α
2x0Pi and k2 = (1−α
2)l+α2x0Pi . For clarity, it
can be seen that B˘12 can be expressed by a base curve in (11),
that is, B˘12 = F
1
2 (x
0
Pi
).
Then, we focus on the case x∗p = 0, namely, p
∗ = m.
Denote this part of B˘1 by B˘11 which is the left orange curve
in Fig. 5(a). Next, we compute the expression of B˘11.
In this scenario, (19) still holds and becomes
‖x0Ej −m‖2 = α‖x
0
Pi −m‖2. (24)
Note that x0Ej ≤ α
2x0Pi is straightforward based on the interval
(22) of x0Ej for x
0
Ej
∈ B˘12 and the monotony of G1(xp) given
by Lemma 1, as Fig. 5(a) shows. Thus, by replacing x0Ej with
a general variable z ∈ R2, it follows from (24) and x0Ej ≤
α2x0Pi that B˘
1
1 is as follows:
B˘11 =
{
z = (x, y) ∈ R2|‖z−m‖2
= α‖x0Pi −m‖2, x ≤ k1, y < 0
} (25)
which can also be represented by a base curve in (11), that is,
B˘11 = F
1
1 (x
0
Pi
).
If x∗p = l, namely, p
∗ = n, denote this part of B˘1 by B˘13
which is the right orange curve in Fig. 5(a). Similar to the
case x∗p = 0, B˘
1
3 is as follows:
B˘13 =
{
z = (x, y) ∈ R2|‖z− n‖2
= α‖x0Pi − n‖2, x ≥ k2, y < 0
}
.
(26)
Thus, B˘13 = F
1
3 (x
0
Pi
) can be obtained.
Therefore, we have constructed the barrier B˘1 = ∪3s=1B˘
1
s ,
without considering the boundary of Ωplay, shown in Fig. 5(a).
Then, consider the effect of the boundary of Ωplay. Since the
optimal trajectories for two players are both straight lines and
Ωplay is convex, it can be concluded that B1 = B˘1 ∩ Ωplay,
as Fig. 5(b) shows. The shape of Ωplay in Fig. 5(b), which
is general, is introduced just for showing that this theorem is
applied for any convex Ωplay.
As depicted in Fig. 5(b), since W1P and W
1
E are two
subregions of Ωplay and separated by B
1, and W1E is closer
to T thanW1P , then the green region is the PWR W
1
P and the
red region is the EWR W1E . Thus, we finish the proof.
Next, we consider the case when k contains two pursuers,
i.e., X 0k =
{
x
0
Pi1
,x0Pi2
}
(1 ≤ i1, i2 ≤ Np, i1 6= i2). The
main result of this section is presented below, which gives the
analytical barrier for two pursuers case.
Theorem 2 (Barrier for Two Pursuers). Consider the system
(1) and suppose that Assumptions 1, 2 and 4 hold. If a pursuit
coalition k contains two pursuers Pi1 and Pi2, its barrier can
be analytically calculated as follows:
a (Only one active pursuer). If only Pi is an active pursuer,
B2(X 0k ) = B
1(x0Pi ) where i = i1 or i2.
b (Two active pursuers). If Pi1 and Pi2 are both active pur-
suers, assume x0Pi1 < x
0
Pi2
. Then, B2(X 0k ) = B˘
2 ∩Ωplay,
where B˘2 = ∪5s=1B˘
2
s and B˘
2
s = F
2
s (x
0
Pi1
,x0Pi2) for all
s = 1, ..., 5.
Proof: Since k contains two pursuers Pi1 and Pi2, according
to Definition 1, we have X 0k = {x
0
Pi1
,x0Pi2}, nk = 2,
and Ik = {m1,m2} = {i1, i2}. Similar to the proof of
Theorem 1, ignore the boundary of Ωplay and consider B˘2
first, as shown in Fig. 6(a).
Part (a): It suffices to consider the case where Pi1 is an
active pursuer and Pi2 is an inactive pursuer.
Since Pi2 is an inactive pursuer, it follows from Definition 4
that
‖x0Pi1 − p‖2 ≤ ‖x
0
Pi2 − p‖2 (27)
holds for all p ∈ T . Hence, Pi1 can reach any point in T
no later than Pi2, and this feature guarantees that Pi1 can
determine the barrier B˘2 alone. Thus, B˘2 = B˘1(x0Pi1).
Part (b): For two active pursuers case, we will show that B˘2
includes five parts B˘2s(s = 1, ..., 5), as depicted in Fig. 6(a).
Since two pursuers are both active, it follows from
Definition 4 that there must exist two points p1 and p2 in
T such that
‖x0Pi1 − p1‖2 < ‖x
0
Pi2 −p1‖2, ‖x
0
Pi2 − p2‖2 < ‖x
0
Pi1 −p2‖2.
(28)
The former in (28) implies that B˘2 depends on Pi1, and the
latter in (28) guarantees that B˘2 depends on Pi2. Thus, in this
case, B˘2 depends on both two pursuers. Naturally, there exists
a unique point pc = (xc, 0) in T that two pursuers can reach
at the same time, as Fig. 6(a) shows.
Note that in this part, x0Pi1 6= x
0
Pi2
; otherwise, it can be
easily verified that one pursuer can reach any point in T no
later than the other, which corresponds to the Part (a). Without
9loss of generality, assume x0Pi1 < x
0
Pi2
as this theorem states.
Thus, pc is given by
‖x0Pi1 − pc‖2 = ‖x
0
Pi2 − pc‖2 ⇒ xc =
‖x0Pi2‖
2
2 − ‖x
0
Pi1
‖22
2(x0Pi2 − x
0
Pi1
)
.
(29)
If xc = 0, i.e., pc = m, it can be seen from Fig. 6(a)
that Pi2 can reach any point in T no later than Pi1. However,
Pi1 is an active pursuer, so xc 6= 0. Similarly, xc 6= l can be
obtained. Thus, we have 0 < xc < l.
Take a point p = (xp, 0) in T . It can be observed in Fig.
6(a) that if xp ∈ [0, xc), ‖x0Pi1 − p‖2 < ‖x
0
Pi2
− p‖2, and if
xp ∈ (xc, l], ‖x
0
Pi2
− p‖2 < ‖x
0
Pi1
− p‖2.
Assume Ej can succeed to reach T , and denote Ej’s OTP
in T by p∗ = (x∗p, 0) such that J in (14) is maximized. It can
be noted that in this case, (14) becomes
J = min
i=i1,i2
‖xPi(t1)− xEj (t1)‖2
V = min
uPi1
,uPi2∈U
max
uEj
∈U
J
(30)
where t1 is the first arrival time when Ej reaches T . Fur-
thermore, assume x0Ej ∈ B˘
2. Therefore, under three players’
optimal strategies from (30), Ej will be captured exactly when
reaching T , namely, V = 0.
If x∗p ∈ [0, xc), as Fig. 6(a) shows, this part of B˘
2 is
determined by Pi1 alone, as Pi1 can reach p
∗ before Pi2. Thus,
by following the proof of Theorem 1, it can be obtained that
if x∗p = 0, i.e., p
∗ = m, and denote the related barrier by B˘21,
then B˘21 = B˘
1
1(x
0
Pi1
), which is the leftmost orange curve in
Fig. 6(a) and given by (25) with x0Pi replaced by x
0
Pi1
. Thus,
it follows from (12) and Theorem 1 that B˘21 can be expressed
by a base curve, i.e., B˘21 = F
2
1 (x
0
Pi1
,x0Pi2).
Consider the remainder x∗p ∈ (0, xc) and denote the related
barrier by B˘22, which is the leftmost black curve in Fig. 6(a).
Next, we compute the expression of B˘22 .
Since x∗p ∈ (0, xc) and J in (30) only depends on Pi1, it
follows from the proof of Theorem 1 that (20) and (21) still
hold for Pi1 and Ej , that is, x
∗
p =
x0Ej−α
2x0Pi1
1−α2 and
(x0Ej − x
0
Pi1 )
2 + (1− 1/α2)(y0Ej )
2 + (1− α2)(y0Pi1)
2 = 0
(31)
representing the relationship between the initial positions of
Pi1 and Ej when x
0
Ej
∈ B˘22. From x
∗
p ∈ (0, xc), we have
x0Ej ∈
(
α2x0Pi1 , (1− α
2)xc + α
2x0Pi1
)
. (32)
Hence, by replacing x0Ej with a general variable z ∈ R
2, it
follows from (31), (32) and y0Ej < 0 that B˘
2
2 is as follows:
B˘22 =
{
z = (x, y) ∈ R2|(x− x0Pi1 )
2 + (1− 1/α2)y2
+(1− α2)(y0Pi1 )
2 = 0, x ∈ (k3, k4), y < 0
} (33)
where k3 = α
2x0Pi1 and k4 = (1−α
2)xc+α
2x0Pi1 . For clarity,
it can be seen that B˘22 can be expressed by a base curve in
(12), that is, B˘22 = F
2
2 (x
0
Pi1
,x0Pi2).
Analogously, when Pi2 can reach p
∗ before Pi1, i.e., x
∗
p ∈
(xc, l], as Fig. 6(a) shows, B˘24 = F
2
4 (x
0
Pi1
,x0Pi2) and B˘
2
5 =
F 25 (x
0
Pi1
,x0Pi2) can be derived respectively for x
∗
p ∈ (xc, l)
Pi1
Pi2
Ej
Pi1
Pi2
Ej
W2P
W2E B2
W˘2E
W˘2P
B˘21
B˘22
B˘23
B˘24
B˘25
Ωplay
Ωplay
Ωtar
Ωtar
p
∗
p
∗
T
T
pc
pc
m
m
n
n
x
x
y
y(a)
(b)
Fig. 6. The barrier and two winning regions determined by two active pursuers
Pi1 and Pi2 when playing with Ej , in which two pursuers both contribute
to the construction of B˘2. (a) Without considering the boundary of Ωplay,
the barrier B˘2 consists of five parts and is given by ∪5s=1B˘
2
s . Two winning
regions W˘2
P
and W˘2
E
for each team’s guaranteed winning are split by B˘2.
(b) By considering the boundary of Ωplay, B
2 is given by B˘2 ∩ Ωplay, as
the optimal trajectories for the players who work in the payoff function, are
straight lines and Ωplay is convex. Naturally, W˘
2
P becomes the green region
W2
P
, and W˘2
E
becomes the red region W2
E
.
and x∗p = l, where B˘
2
4 is the rightmost black curve and B˘
2
5 is
the rightmost orange curve.
Finally, consider the case x∗p = xc, i.e., p
∗ = pc, which
corresponds to the middle orange barrier B˘23 in Fig. 6(a). Note
that (19) still holds for Pi1 and Ej and can be rewritten as
‖pc − x
0
Ej‖2 = α‖pc − x
0
Pi1‖2. (34)
Naturally, x0Ej should lie in [k4, k5], where k5 = (1−α
2)xc+
α2x0Pi2 which actually is the boundary of the x value of B˘
2
4.
Thus, by replacing x0Ej with a general variable z ∈ R
2, it
follows from (34) and y0Ej < 0 that B˘
2
3 is as follows:
B˘23 =
{
z = (x, y) ∈ R2|‖z− pc‖2
= α‖x0Pi1 − pc‖2, x ∈ [k4, k5], y < 0
}
.
(35)
It can also be noted that B˘23 can be expressed by a base curve
in (12), that is, B˘23 = F
2
3 (x
0
Pi1
,x0Pi2).
Therefore, we have constructed the barrier B˘2 = ∪5s=1B˘
2
s ,
without considering the boundary of Ωplay, shown in Fig. 6(a).
Now, consider the effect of the boundary of Ωplay. Since the
optimal trajectories for three players (if it works in the payoff
function J) are straight lines and Ωplay is convex, B2 = B˘2 ∩
Ωplay holds, as Fig. 6(b) shows. Intuitively, the PWR W2P is
the green region, and the EWR W2E is the red region.
C. General Pursuit Coalitions Versus One Evader
The objective in this section is to construct the barrier for
general pursuit coalitions with the inspiration from the results
derived in two pursuers case. First, the barrier for a special
class of pursuit coalitions whose pursuers are all active, is
constructed. Then theoretically, it is demonstrated that every
pursuit coalition can be degenerated into a unique pursuit
subcoalition of this class. Finally, this pursuit subcoalition and
the original pursuit coalition are proved to possess the same
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barrier. To this end, the definition of this special class pursuit
coalition is formally introduced as follows.
Definition 6 (Full-Active Pursuit Coalition). Given a pursuit
coalition k, if for any pursuer Pi(i ∈ Ik) in k, there always
exists a point in T that Pi can reach before all other pursuers
in k, then k is called a full-active pursuit coalition.
It can be verified that if a pursuit coalition k is full-active,
its members must have different x-coordinates. Otherwise,
assume that in k, Pi1 and Pi2 have the same x-coordinate.
Thus, it can be noted that one pursuer can reach any point
in T no later than the other one, which contradicts with the
fact that two pursuers are both active. Hence, for every full-
active pursuit coalition k with nk ≥ 2, introduce an auxiliary
index set Iˆk = {mˆj|1 ≤ mˆj ≤ Np, j = 1, 2, ..., nk} = Ik
such that x0Pmˆi
< x0Pmˆi+1
holds for all i = 1, 2, ..., nk − 1.
More intuitively, we mean that Pmˆi lies at the left side of
Pmˆi+1 along the x-axis. We call Iˆk as x-rank index set, and
obviously it is unique.
With the above x-rank index set Iˆk, the theorem presented
below provides a scheme to construct the barrier for full-active
pursuit coalitions.
Theorem 3 (Barrier for Full-Active Pursuit Coalition). Con-
sider the system (1) and suppose that Assumptions 1, 2 and
4 hold. If a pursuit coalition k with the initial condition X 0k
and nk pursuers, is full-active, its corresponding barrier can
be constructed analytically as follows:
(i). If nk = 1, Bnk(X 0k ) is given by Theorem 1. If nk = 2,
Bnk(X 0k ) is given by Theorem 2(b).
(ii). If 3 ≤ nk ≤ Np, let Iˆk denote its x-rank index set. Then,
Bnk(X 0k ) = B˘
nk ∩ Ωplay, where
B˘nk = ∪2i=1 F
2
i (x
0
Pmˆ1
,x0Pmˆ2 ) ∪
nk−1
i=1 F
2
3 (x
0
Pmˆi
,x0Pmˆi+1
)
∪nk−1i=2 F
3(x0Pmˆi−1
,x0Pmˆi
,x0Pmˆi+1
)
∪5i=4 F
2
i (x
0
Pmˆnk−1
,x0Pmˆnk
).
(36)
Proof: Note that the conclusion (i) is straightforward. Thus,
we focus on the conclusion (ii). Construct B˘nk first, namely,
ignore the boundary of Ωplay.
Since k is full-active, according to Definition 6, for every
pursuer in k, there always exists a point in T that it can
reach before all other pursuers in k. Thus, every pursuer in k
contributes to B˘nk .
Next, a method is presented to construct the barrier B˘nk .
First, by Theorem 2(b), construct the barrier B˘2 determined
by Pmˆ1 and Pmˆ2 , as Fig. 6(a) shows by replacing Pi1 and Pi2
with Pmˆ1 and Pmˆ2 respectively. Then, add the third pursuer
Pmˆ3 and compute the associated B˘
3 which is proved below to
consist of seven parts, as Fig. 7(a) shows.
According to the definition of the x-rank index set presented
above, x0Pmˆ1
< x0Pmˆ2
< x0Pmˆ3
holds. Take two points pc1 and
pc2 in T such that
‖x0Pmˆi − pci‖2 = ‖x
0
Pmˆi+1
− pci‖2, i = 1, 2 (37)
Pmˆ1
Pmˆ2
Pmˆ3Ej
Pmˆ1
Pmˆ2
Pmˆ3Ej
W3P
W3E B3
W˘3E
W˘3P
F 21
F 22
F 23
F 3 F
2
3
F 24
F 25
Ωplay
Ωplay
Ωtar
Ωtar
p
∗
p
∗
T
T
pc1
pc2pc1
pc2m
m
n
n
x
x
y
y(a)
(b)
Fig. 7. The barrier and two winning regions determined by three active
pursuers Pmˆ1 , Pmˆ2 and Pmˆ3 when playing with Ej , in which all three
pursuers contribute to the construction of B˘3. (a) Without considering the
boundary of Ωplay, the barrier B˘
3 consists of seven parts. Two winning
regions W˘3P and W˘
3
E for each team’s guaranteed winning are split by B˘
3.
(b) By considering the boundary of Ωplay, B
3 is given by B˘3 ∩ Ωplay, as
the optimal trajectories for the players who work in the payoff function, are
straight lines and Ωplay is convex. Naturally, W˘
3
P
becomes the green region
W3P , and W˘
3
E becomes the red region W
3
E .
holds, as depicted in Fig. 7(a), that is, pci is the point in T
having the same distance to Pmˆi and Pmˆi+1 . Thus, from (37),
pci = (xci, 0) can be computed as follows:
xci =
‖x0Pmˆi+1
‖22 − ‖x
0
Pmˆi
‖22
2(x0Pmˆi+1
− x0Pmˆi
)
, i = 1, 2. (38)
Since Pmˆ1 is an active pursuer, there must exist a point in
T that Pmˆ1 can reach before Pmˆ2 . Thus, xc1 > 0, as Fig. 7(a)
shows. Similarly, xc2 < l also holds. Take a point p = (xp, 0)
in T . It can be obtained that if xp ∈ [0, xc1), Pmˆ1 can reach
p before Pmˆ2 , and if xp ∈ (xc2, l], Pmˆ3 can reach p before
Pmˆ2 . Since Pmˆ2 is an active pursuer, there must exist a point
in T that Pmˆ2 can reach before both Pmˆ1 and Pmˆ3 . Thus,
xc1 < xc2 holds. In conclusion, 0 < xc1 < xc2 < l is derived,
as Fig. 7(a) illustrates.
Assume Ej can succeed to reach T , and denote Ej’s OTP
in T by p∗ = (x∗p, 0) such that J in (14) only involving these
three pursuers is maximized. Thus in this case, (14) becomes
J = min
i=mˆ1,mˆ2,mˆ3
‖xPi(t1)− xEj (t1)‖2
V = min
uPmˆ1
,uPmˆ2
,uPmˆ3
∈U
max
uEj
∈U
J
(39)
where t1 is the first arrival time when Ej reaches T . Similarly,
we further assume x0Ej ∈ B˘
3. Therefore, under four players’
optimal strategies from (39), Ej will be captured exactly when
reaching T , namely, V = 0.
If x∗p ∈ [0, xc1), as Fig. 7(a) shows, Pmˆ1 can reach p
∗ before
both Pmˆ2 and Pmˆ3 . Thus, this part of B˘
3 is determined by
Pmˆ1 alone, namely, J only depends on Pmˆ1 . By following the
proof of Theorem 2, the part related to Pmˆ1 alone is given by
F 21 (x
0
Pmˆ1
,x0Pmˆ2
) ∪ F 22 (x
0
Pmˆ1
,x0Pmˆ2
), respectively for x∗p = 0
and x∗p ∈ (0, xc1), which consists of the leftmost orange and
black curves in Fig. 7(a).
If x∗p ∈ (xc1, xc2), as Fig. 7(a) shows, Pmˆ2 can reach p
∗
before both Pmˆ1 and Pmˆ3 , implying that this part of B˘
3 is
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determined by Pmˆ2 alone, namely, J only depends on Pmˆ2 .
Thus, it follows from the proof of Theorem 1 that (20) and
(21) hold for Pmˆ2 and Ej , that is, x
∗
p =
x0Ej
−α2x0Pmˆ2
1−α2 and
(x0Ej − x
0
Pmˆ2
)2 + (1− 1/α2)(y0Ej )
2 + (1− α2)(y0Pmˆ2 )
2 = 0
(40)
which characterizes the relationship between the initial posi-
tions of Pmˆ2 and Ej when x
0
Ej
∈ B˘3 and x∗p ∈ (xc1, xc2).
Also note that from x∗p ∈ (xc1, xc2), we have
x0Ej ∈
(
(1 − α2)xc1 + α
2x0Pmˆ2
, (1 − α2)xc2 + α
2x0Pmˆ2
)
.
(41)
Therefore, by replacing x0Ej with a general variable z ∈ R
2,
it follows from (40), (41) and y0Ej < 0 that this part of B˘
3,
which is the middle black curve in Fig. 7(a), is given by
{
z = (x, y) ∈ R2|(x− x0Pmˆ2 )
2 + (1 − 1/α2)y2
+ (1 − α2)(y0Pmˆ2 )
2 = 0, x ∈ (k7, k8), y < 0
} (42)
where k7 = (1 − α2)xc1 + α2x0Pmˆ2
and k8 = (1 − α2)xc2 +
α2x0Pmˆ2
. From (13), it can be noted that (42) can be expressed
by a base curve, that is, F 3(x0Pmˆ1
,x0Pmˆ2
,x0Pmˆ3
).
If x∗p ∈ (xc2, l], as Fig. 7(a) shows, this part of B˘
3 is only
related to Pmˆ3 . Based on the similar analysis for the case
x∗p ∈ [0, xc1), this part, which consists of the rightmost black
and orange curves in Fig. 7(a), is given by F 24 (x
0
Pmˆ2
,x0Pmˆ3
)∪
F 25 (x
0
Pmˆ2
,x0Pmˆ3
).
Now, we consider the remainder x∗p = xc1 or x
∗
p = xc2. For
simplicity, we only consider x∗p = xc1, and similar analysis
can be conducted for x∗p = xc2. Note that x
∗
p = xc1, i.e.,
p∗ = pc1, and (19) holds for Pmˆ1 and Ej . Similar to the
analysis for x∗p = xc in the proof of Theorem 2, this part of
B˘3, which is the second orange curve from the left in Fig. 7(a),
is given by a base curve in (12), that is, F 23 (x
0
Pmˆ1
,x0Pmˆ2
).
Thus, by connecting all these parts of B˘3, we can obtain B˘3
given by (36) with nk = 3, shown in Fig. 7(a).
Similarly, add the fourth pursuer Pmˆ4 , and pc3 = (xc3, 0)
is given by (38) with i = 3. Then, 0 < xc1 < xc2 < xc3 < l
can be obtained. In the same way, B˘4 is given by (36) with
nk = 4. Therefore, by adding the remaining pursuers one by
one along the x-rank index set Iˆk, B˘nk is obtained as (36)
shows.
Then, consider the effect of the boundary of Ωplay. Since
the optimal trajectories for the players who work in the payoff
function J , are straight lines and Ωplay is convex, it can be
obtained that Bnk = B˘nk ∩ Ωplay, as Fig. 7(b) shows when
nk = 3. Naturally, the PWR W3P is the green region, and the
EWR W3E is the red region. Thus we finish the proof.
Note that in general pursuit coalitions, there may exist some
inactive pursuers who as asserted below, have no effect on the
barrier construction but instead hinder our analysis. In light
of this, if all active pursuers can be extracted out from any
given pursuit coalition, namely, its largest full-active pursuit
subcoalition, then the barrier for this general pursuit coalition
can be obtained from Theorem 3.
First, the following lemma formally establishes a connection
of the barrier between a general pursuit coalition and its largest
full-active pursuit subcoalition.
Lemma 3 (Barrier Equivalence). For any pursuit coalition
k, Bnk(X 0k ) = B
n¯k(X¯ 0k ) holds, where X¯
0
k with n¯k pursuers
denotes the initial position of the unique largest full-active
pursuit subcoalition of X 0k .
Proof: Obviously, we only need to focus on the case that
X 0k \ X¯
0
k is nonempty. Thus, nk > n¯k. For simplicity, we
prove WnkE = W
n¯k
E . By definition, W
nk
E ⊆ W
n¯k
E holds, as
reducing the pursuer will result in the same or expansion of the
EWR. Thus we only need to verifyW n¯kE ⊆ W
nk
E , equivalently,
W˘ n¯kE ⊆ W˘
nk
E .
Suppose p ∈ W˘ n¯kE . Then, there must exist a point p1 ∈ T
such that
‖p− p1‖2 < α‖x
0
Pi − p1‖2 (43)
holds for all x0Pi ∈ X¯
0
k . Assume that there exists a pursuer Pj
satisfying x0Pj ∈ X
0
k \ X¯
0
k and
α‖x0Pj − p1‖2 ≤ ‖p− p1‖2 (44)
Then, by (43) and (44), it can be stated that
‖x0Pj − p1‖2 < ‖x
0
Pi − p1‖2 (45)
holds for all x0Pi ∈ X¯
0
k . Thus, there exists a point, i.e, p1,
in T that Pj can reach before all pursuers in X¯
0
k , which
contradicts with the fact that X¯ 0k is the largest full-active
pursuit subcoalition of X 0k . Therefore, we can conclude that
(44) does not hold, that is,
‖p− p1‖2 < α‖x
0
Pj − p1‖2 (46)
holds for all x0Pj ∈ X
0
k \ X¯
0
k . Combining (43) with (46) shows
that there exists a point, i.e., p1, in T that p can reach before
all pursuers in X 0k with a speed ratio α. Thus, p ∈ W˘
nk
E ,
implying that W˘ n¯kE ⊆ W˘
nk
E .
The existence of X¯ 0k is straightforward, as X¯
0
k is a subset of
X 0k . As for the uniqueness, assume that X¯
0
k with n¯k pursuers
and Y¯0k with m¯k pursuers are two distinct largest full-active
pursuit subcoalitions of X 0k .
Take a pursuer Pi satisfying x
0
Pi
∈ X¯ 0k and x
0
Pi
/∈ Y¯0k . Then,
it follows from Definition 6 that x0Pi /∈ Y¯
0
k implies that there
is no point in T that Pi can reach before all pursuers in Y¯0k . In
other words, there is no point in T that Pi can reach before all
other pursuers in X 0k , which contradicts with the fact that x
0
Pi
is an active pursuer by noting that x0Pi ∈ X¯
0
k . Thus, X¯
0
k = Y¯
0
k
and the uniqueness is proved.
Denote by RD the set of points in R2 that Pmi can reach
before Pmj , which is mathematically formulated as follows:
RD
(
x
0
Pmi
,x0Pmj
)
=
{
z ∈ R2|‖z− x0Pmi ‖2
< ‖z− x0Pmj ‖2
}
.
(47)
It can be noted that RD is a half plane.
Next, for a pursuit coalition k, an algorithm is presented to
find its unique largest full-active pursuit subcoalition, namely,
X¯ 0k . To avoid redundant illustration, the proof of this algorithm
is left in the next theorem.
Algorithm 1. (Algorithm for Finding the Largest Full-Active
Pursuit Subcoalition in k).
1: Input: X 0k ∈ Ω
nk
play ∪ T
nk , X¯ 0k ← ∅, n¯k ← 0.
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2: for i ∈ {1, ..., nk} do
3: T1 = T
4: for j ∈ {1, ..., nk}, j 6= i do
5: T1 = RD(x0Pmi
,x0Pmj
) ∩ T1 end for
6: if T1 6= ∅ then
7: X¯ 0k ← X¯
0
k ∪ x
0
Pmi
, n¯k ← n¯k + 1 end if end for
8: Output: X¯ 0k , n¯k.
Now it suffices to present the main result of this section.
Theorem 4 (Barrier for General Pursuit Coalition). Consider
the system (1) satisfying Assumptions 1, 2 and 4. For a pursuit
coalition k, its largest full-active pursuit subcoalition X¯ 0k with
n¯k pursuers can be found by Algorithm 1. Then, B
nk(X 0k ) =
Bn¯k(X¯ 0k ), where B
n¯k(X¯ 0k ) can be computed by Theorem 3.
Proof: According to Lemma 3 and Theorem 3, if the va-
lidity of Algorithm 1 can be verified, this theorem holds
naturally.
From line 3 to line 5 in Algorithm 1, the set of points in T
that Pmi can reach before all other pursuers in k, is computed
and denoted by T1, where RD(x
0
Pmi
,x0Pmj
) denotes the set
of points in R2 that Pmi can reach before Pmj as (47) shows.
Thus, if T1 6= ∅, that is, there exists at least one point that Pi
can reach before all other pursuers in k, then Pi must be an
active pursuer in k. Conversely, if T1 = ∅, namely, there is no
point in T that Pi can reach before all other pursuers in k,
then Pi must be an inactive pursuer in k.
D. Extensions to Relaxed Initial Deployment
In this section, the barrier construction method will be ex-
tended to the scenarios having more realistic initial deployment
as Assumption 3 shows. In this initial deployment, pursuers
are allowed to initially lie in Ωtar. For example, there may exist
pursuers who are patrolling in Ωtar exactly when evaders are
detected. As discussed below, by introducing a specific virtual
pursuer, a road between this case and the known results is
established. Or, more concretely, it is demonstrated that this
virtual pursuer plays the same role with its original pursuer in
barrier construction.
Definition 7 (Virtual Pursuer). For every pursuer Pi whose
initial condition satisfies x0Pi = (x
0
Pi
, y0Pi) ∈ Ωtar, introduce
a virtual pursuer P˜i with the initial position x˜
0
Pi
= (x˜0Pi , y˜
0
Pi
)
such that x˜0Pi = x
0
Pi
and y˜0Pi = −y
0
Pi
.
Remark 3. It can be easily observed that the virtual pursuer
and its original pursuer are symmetric with respect to T , and
a three-pursuer pursuit coalition example is presented in Fig. 8
where Pmˆ1 lies in Ωtar and its virtual pursuer is the red circle
P˜mˆ1 . Since Ωplay and Ωtar allow different shapes, the virtual
pursuer may lie out of Ω. Recalling the barrier construction
process under Assumptions 1 and 2, it can be claimed that
this case can also be unified by constructing B˘nk first and
then computing B˘nk ∩ Ωplay, as the optimal trajectories for
the players are straight lines and Ω is convex.
Remark 4. Note that the virtual pursuer generated by one
pursuer may coincide with another pursuer, which will lead to
a disagreement with Assumption 1. Thus, assume that every
Pmˆ1
P˜mˆ1 Pmˆ2
Pmˆ3W3P
W3E B
3
Ωplay
Ωtar
Tm n
x
y
Fig. 8. The barrier and winning regions for relaxed initial deployment which
allows the pursuer to start the game from Ωtar . The red circle P˜mˆ1 is the
virtual pursuer of Pmˆ1 , and they are symmetric with respect to T . It is
proved that the barrier B3 determined by Pmˆ1 , Pmˆ2 and Pmˆ3 is the same as
the barrier determined by P˜mˆ1 , Pmˆ2 and Pmˆ3 . This feature is called mirror
property.
virtual pursuer does not coincide with all other pursuers.
However, the coincidence of the virtual pursuer and its own
original pursuer is allowed, namely, when x0Pi ∈ T .
Next, an important property of virtual pursuers in terms of
the barrier construction will be stated, which is a key step to
simplify the problems.
Lemma 4 (Mirror Property). For a pursuit coalition k, if
x
0
Pi
∈ Ωtar (i ∈ Ik), let X 0k (−i) denote the remaining
pursuers in k when x0Pi is eliminated, and x˜
0
Pi
denote the
virtual pursuer of x0Pi . Then, B
nk(X 0k ) = B
nk(X 0k (−i)∪ x˜
0
Pi
).
Proof: Suppose p ∈ WnkE (X
0
k (−i) ∪ x˜
0
Pi
), and then there
must exist a point p1 ∈ T such that
‖p− p1‖2 < α‖x
0
Pj − p1‖2 (48)
holds for all x0Pj ∈ X
0
k (−i)∪ x˜
0
Pi
. According to Definition 7,
we have
‖x0Pi − p1‖2 = ‖x˜
0
Pi − p1‖2. (49)
Naturally, (48) holds for all x0Pj ∈ X
0
k , which implies that
p ∈ WnkE (X
0
k ). Therefore, W
nk
E (X
0
k (−i) ∪ x˜
0
Pi
) ⊂ WnkE (X
0
k )
is obtained.
On the other side, suppose p ∈ WnkE (X
0
k ) and in the
similar way, p ∈ WnkE (X
0
k (−i) ∪ x˜
0
Pi
) can be derived, im-
plying WnkE (X
0
k ) ⊂ W
nk
E (X
0
k (−i)∪ x˜
0
Pi
). Thus, WnkE (X
0
k ) =
WnkE (X
0
k (−i) ∪ x˜
0
Pi
), which finishes the proof by noting that
Bnk is the separating curve between WnkP and W
nk
E . A three
pursuer case is presented in Fig. 8, where Pmˆ1 lies in Ωtar.
The main result in this section is now given, which provides
an efficient way to construct the barrier under Assumptions 1
and 3 by projecting this problem into the field of the former
section.
Corollary 1 (Barrier for Relaxed Initial Deployment). Con-
sider the system (1) and suppose that Assumptions 1, 3 and
4 hold. For a pursuit coalition k, let X 0k,1 and X
0
k,2 (maybe
empty) denote the initial sets of its pursuers who lie in Ωplay
and Ωtar respectively. By one-to-one mapping of X 0k,2, a set of
virtual pursuers can be obtained and denote it by X˜ 0k,2. Then,
Bnk(X 0k ) = B
nk(X 0k,1 ∪ X˜
0
k,2) holds, where B
nk(X 0k,1 ∪ X˜
0
k,2)
can be computed by Theorem 4.
Proof: Since all players in X 0k,1 ∪ X˜
0
k,2 lie in Ωplay ∪ T ,
this corollary is straightforward by considering Lemma 4 and
Theorem 4.
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V. PURSUIT TASK ASSIGNMENT
In the next, by matching pursuit coalitions with evaders,
an optimal task assignment scheme for the pursuit team to
guarantee the most evaders intercepted, will be investigated.
Intuitively, for every evader, we want to designate a pursuit
coalition which can make sure of capturing it. In view of
the characteristics of winning regions, the selection of an
adequate pursuit coalition can be realized by checking if this
evader lies in the capturable region of this pursuit coalition,
namely,WnkP . In this way, rich prior information about which
evaders can be captured by a specified pursuit coalition, is
collected. Then, pursuit coalitions can be matched with evaders
one by one such that the most evaders are captured. Finally,
this maximum matching is formulated as a simplified 0-1
integer programming problem instead of solving a constrained
bipartite matching problem [54].
Let G = (P,E, E) denote an undirected bipartite graph,
consisting of two independent sets P,E of nodes, and a set
E of unordered pairs of nodes called edges each of which
connects a node in P to one in E. In this case, we take P =
{1, 2, ..., 2Np−1}, representing all pursuit coalitions, and E =
{1, 2, .., Ne} on behalf of all evaders. An edge from node i in
P to node j in E is denoted by eij , referring to using pursuit
coalition i to intercept evader Ej . Define eij ∈ E if pursuit
coalition i can guarantee the capture of evader Ej in Ωplay
or T ; otherwise, eij /∈ E . Thus, by computing the barrier for
every pursuit coalition, all edges contained in E can be found.
Traditionally, a subset M ⊆ E is said to be a matching if no
two edges in M are incident to the same node, and our goal
is to find a matching containing a maximum number of edges.
However, note that every pursuer can appear in at most one
pursuit coalition when the interception scheme is executed.
Thus, the pursuit coalitions containing at least one same
pursuer cannot coexist, which results in a constrained bipartite
matching problem. To solve it, this problem is transformed into
the framework of 0-1 integer programming.
Before proceeding with this transformation, the following
lemma is presented, which will dramatically decrease the
complexity of the 0-1 integer programming proposed later.
Lemma 5 (Degeneration of Pursuit Coalition). For any pursuit
coalition k with nk ≥ 3, if there exists an evader Ej such that
x
0
Ej
∈ WnkP , then there must exist a pursuit subcoalition k1
of k satisfying nk1 = 2 and x
0
Ej
∈ W
nk1
P .
Proof: Note that Theorem 3 manifests a special feature of
the barrier that its every part is only associated with at most
two pursuers as (36) shows. Even for the part F 3, one can split
it into two parts both of which are only associated with two
pursuers. Thus, if a pursuit coalition k can guarantee to capture
an evader, then there must exist an its two-pursuer subcoalition
which can also guarantee the capture of this evader.
Remark 5. From Lemma 5, it can be stated that any max-
imum matching can be reduced to a simpler version in
which every pursuit coalition contains at most two pursuers.
Therefore, seeking for a maximum matching in the class of
this simple version suffices to obtain a matching that is global
optimal in the sense of the most evaders intercepted.
Remark 6. Although it follows from Lemma 5 and Remark 5
that the pursuit coalitions with more than two pursuers are not
necessary in the maximum matching, the analysis for general
pursuit coalitions in Section IV-C can provide instructions to
determine the capturable and uncapturable regions of multi-
ple pursuers with any numbers when pursuing one evader.
Additionally, this result can also help to deploy the pursuers
such that their capturable region is desirable, as sometimes
the pursuit team should position its members before an evader
occurs. More importantly, it is Theorem 3 that reveals the
degeneration property of the pursuit coalition described in
Lemma 5.
Thus, in the following discussion, attention will be focused
on this specific class of pursuit coalitions with at most two
pursuers, and due to its crucial role in extracting out an optimal
task assignment, it is stated formally as follows.
Definition 8 (Execution Pursuit Coalition). A pursuit coalition
k is called an execution pursuit coalition, if nk = 1 or nk = 2.
According to the barrier construction in Section IV, the fol-
lowing prior information vector can be acquired. For notational
convenience, define Nv = NeNp(Np + 1)/2.
Definition 9 (Prior Information Vector). For Pi, define
r1i = [r
1
i (1), ..., r
1
i (Ne)] ∈ R
Ne , where for j = 1, ..., Ne,
set r1i (j) = 0 if x
0
Ej
∈ W1E(x
0
Pi
), that is, Pi cannot
guarantee to capture Ej prior to its arrival in T ; other-
wise, set r1i (j) = 1. Similarly, for Pi1 and Pi2, define
r2i1,i2 = [r
2
i1,2(1), ..., r
2
i1,i2(Ne)] ∈ R
Ne , where for j =
1, ..., Ne, set r
2
i1,i2(j) = 0 if x
0
Ej
∈ W2E(x
0
Pi1
∪ x0Pi2 );
otherwise, set r2i1,i2(j) = 1. Then we call this vector r =
[r11 , ..., r
1
Np
, r21,2, ...r
2
1,Np
, r22,3, ..., r
2
Np−1,Np
] ∈ RNv as prior
information vector.
Remark 7. Note that the prior information vector r contains
all information by which for any given evader, one can judge
whether an execution pursuit coalition can guarantee to capture
it. This vector is the only input for the maximum matching.
Let s1i = [s
1
i (1), ..., s
1
i (Ne)] ∈ R
Ne denote the strategy
vector of Pi. Its elements are either 1 or 0, where s
1
i (j) = 1
indicates the assignment of Pi to intercept Ej , and s
1
i (j) = 0
means no assignment. Clearly,
∑Ne
j=1 s
1
i (j) ≤ 1 must be satis-
fied, namely, Pi at a time can pursue at most one evader. Let
s2i1,i2 = [s
2
i1,i2(1), ..., s
2
i1,i2(Ne)] ∈ R
Ne denote the strategy
vector of the pursuit pair {Pi1, Pi2}. Its elements are either
1 or 0. Specifically, s2i1,i2(j) = 1 indicates that the pursuit
pair {Pi1, Pi2} cooperates to intercept Ej , and s2i1,i2(j) = 0
means no assignment. Obviously,
∑Ne
j=1 s
2
i1i2(j) ≤ 1.
Denote the joint strategy vector of all one-pursuer pursuit
coalitions by s1 = [s11, ..., s
1
Np
] ∈ RNpNe , and denote
s2 = [s21,2, ..., s
2
1,Np
, s22,3, ..., s
2
Np−1,Np
] ∈ RNeNp(Np−1)/2 as
the joint strategy vector of all two-pursuer pursuit coalitions.
Thus z = [s1, s2]T ∈ RNv×1 denotes all execution pursuit
coalitions’ strategy vector.
Let ones(m,n) denote the m × n matrix each element of
which is 1, zeros(m,n) denote the m × n zero matrix, In
denote the identity matrix of size n, ⊗ denote the Kronecker
14
product, and X 0P ,X
0
E denote the initial positions of all pursuers
and all evaders, respectively.
Now, the main result of this section is presented below,
which gives a maximum matching solution by solving a 0-1
integer programming.
Theorem 5 (Maximum Matching). Consider the system (1)
and suppose that Assumptions 1, 3 and 4 hold. Given X 0P and
X 0E , the number q of the evaders which the pursuit team can
guarantee to prevent from reaching the target region Ωtar is
given by
q = maximize cTz
s. t. A1z ≤ b1, A2z ≤ b2, A3z ≤ b3
z = [s1, s2]T = [z(1), ..., z(Nv)]
T, z(i) = 0, 1
(50)
and the maximum matching is given by z∗ = argmax
z
(cTz).
The parameter matrixes and vectors are defined as follows:
c = ones(Nv, 1), b1 = r
T, A1 = INv , b2 = ones(Ne, 1),
A2 = ones(1, Nv/Ne)⊗ INe , b3 = ones(Np, 1)
(51)
and A3 is computed by Algorithm 2 presented below.
Proof: Note that the objective function is the number of
evaders which are assigned execution pursuit coalitions, that is,
the number of the evaders to be captured. The first inequality
constraint in (50) represents that the prior information must
be satisfied. In other words, assign an adequate execution
pursuit coalition to capture an evader. The second inequality
constraint indicates that each evader is assigned at most one
pursuit coalition, and the third one restricts that each pursuer
can occur at most one pursuit coalition when the game runs. It
can be verified that Algorithm 2 can find all execution pursuit
coalitions which contain a specific pursuer. Thus, this 0-1
integer programming is solvable.
Algorithm 2. (Matrix for Inequality Constraint).
1: Input: Np, Ne, and A3 ←null matrix.
2: if Np ≥ 2 then
3: for i ∈ {1, 2, ..., Np} do
4: temp←null matix
5: for j ∈ {1, 2, ..., Np(Np − 1)/2} do
6: tag← 0
7: for k ∈ {1, 2, ..., i− 1}(i ≥ 2) do
8: if j == i− k + (k − 1)(Np − k/2) then
9: tag← 1,break end if end for
10: if j ≥ (i− 1)(Np − i/2) + 1 &&
11: j ≤ i(Np − (i + 1)/2) then
12: tag ← 1 end if
13: temp← [temp, tag] end for
14: A3 ← [A3; temp] end for
15: A3 ← A3 ⊗ ones(1, Ne) end if
16: A3 ← [INp ⊗ ones(1, Ne), A3]
17:Output: A3.
Remark 8. It can be observed that q is unique, while the
maximum matching z∗ may have multiple solutions. More-
over, the original matching is a (2Np − 1) × Ne constrained
bipartite matching problem, which is a NP-problem. However,
the maximum matching given by Theorem 5 is a P-problem
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Fig. 9. 5 pursuers versus 6 evaders. (a) − (e) Computation of the barrier
and winning regions for all pursuit coalitions when facing one evader: (a) all
one-pursuer pursuit coalitions; (b) two-pursuer pursuit coalitions (only two
are depicted); (c) three-pursuer pursuit coalitions (only two are depicted);
(d) four-pursuer pursuit coalitions (only two are depicted); (5) five-pursuer
pursuit coalition. Fig. 9(e) also shows the generated maximum matching: two
one-to-one matching pairs and one two-to-one matching pair. Thus, the pursuit
team currently can guarantee to capture at most three evaders in Ωplay.
with Nv variables and Nv + Ne +Np inequality constraints.
The first inequality constraint in (50) will be simplified a lot
when r contains many zero elements.
Definition 10 (Maximum Matching Pairs). For a maximum
matching z∗ = [s1∗, s2∗]T, define the following sets of
matching pairs:
M1(z∗) =
{
(i, j)|s1∗i (j) = 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ Np, 1 ≤ j ≤ Ne
}
M2(z∗) =
{
(i1, i2, j)|s2∗i1,i2(j) = 1, 1 ≤ i1 < i2 ≤ Np,
1 ≤ j ≤ Ne
}
.
(52)
Note that M1(z∗) represents all one-to-one matching pairs
in z∗, and M2(z∗) represents all two-to-one matching pairs.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, simulation results are presented to illustrate
the previous theoretical developments. Assume that vP =
1m/s, vE = 0.7m/s, namely, α = 0.7, Np = 5 and Ne = 6.
Fig. 9 shows the barrier and winning regions for all pursuit
coalitions, namely, their capturable and uncapturable regions,
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where Fig. 9(a) and Fig. 9(e) refer to all one-pursuer pursuit
coalitions and five-pursuer pursuit coalition, respectively. For
clarity, only two barriers and winning regions are depicted for
two-pursuer, three-pursuer, and four-pursuer pursuit coalitions
in Fig. 9(b), Fig. 9(c), and Fig. 9(d), respectively.
Fig. 9(e) also shows the maximum matching from the
known barrier and winning regions, including two one-to-one
matching pairs and one two-to-one matching pair. Thus, the
maximum matching is of size 3. This guarantees that if each
pursuer occurring in the maximum matching plays optimally
against the evader matched by the maximum matching, this
matched evader will be captured before reaching T .
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
A. Conclusions
This paper considered a multiplayer reach-avoid game in a
general convex domain. The key achievement is providing an
analytical description of the winning regions when each pos-
sible pursuit coalition competes with one evader. Furthermore,
an interception scheme involving pursuer-evader matching is
generated for the pursuit team such that the most evaders can
be captured before entering the target region. The constructed
barrier, splitting the winning regions, shows that at most two
pursuers are needed to intercept one evader if the capture is
possible, greatly simplifying the matching search.
The winning regions from the whole pursuit team and one
evader case also can help the evasion team to determine which
evaders can enter the target region or escape from the play
region definitely, no matter what strategy the pursuit team uses.
Then these evaders will get more attention from the evasion
team and be chosen as key mission performers. More gener-
ally, this result can provide guarantees on goal satisfaction and
safety of optimal system trajectories for safety-critical systems,
where a group of vehicles aim to reach their destinations in
the presence of dynamic obstacles.
The results in this paper are almost analytical and applicable
for real-time updates. More importantly, all possible pursuit
coalitions are considered and our results are optimal in the
sense of the most evaders intercepted.
B. Future Work
All players considered in this paper move with simple mo-
tion and are able to turn instantaneously. In future work, more
practical and complex dynamic models will be considered, for
example, those of the Isaacs-Dubins car. Extending the results
obtained in general convex domains to nonconvex domains
is another worth-pursuing direction, and extracting out some
conservative results is straightforward, such as, approximating
the nonconvex domain with an appropriate convex domain. In
view of the limited communication and computing power of a
single player, another interesting and promising possibility for
future extension is to consider distributed multiplayer reach-
avoid games, which are the focus of our following research.
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